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The present study investigated whether semantic negative priming from single prime
words depends on the availability of cognitive control resources. Participants with
high vs. low working memory capacity (as assessed by their performance in complex
span and attentional control tasks) were instructed to either attend to or ignore a
briefly presented single prime word that was followed by either a semantically related
or unrelated target word on which participants made a lexical decision. Individual
differences in working memory capacity (WMC) mainly affected the processing of the
ignored primes, but not the processing of the attended primes: While the latter produced
reliable positive semantic priming for both high- and low-WMC participants, the former
gave rise to reliable semantic negative priming only for high WMC participants, with
low WMC participants showing the opposite positive priming effect. The present results
extend previous findings in demonstrating that (a) single negative priming can reliably
generalize to semantic associates of the prime words, and (b) a differential availability
of cognitive control resources can reliably modulate the negative priming effect at a
semantic level of representation.
Keywords: working memory capacity, negative priming, individual differences, attentional control, semantic
priming
INTRODUCTION
Selection of a relevant stimulus from among competing irrelevant stimuli is a core cognitive
ability. Without efficient selection, coherent interaction with a dynamic and complex environment
becomes impossible. An influential paradigm in cognitive psychology that was originally developed
to measure attentional selection is that of Negative Priming (NP). NP is typically observed in
selective attention tasks that present target stimuli among distractors in two consecutive displays
(the first called the prime display and the second called the probe display). The NP effect (Tipper,
1985) is the finding that observers are slower to respond to a target stimulus that appeared as a
distractor stimulus on the prime display compared with a target stimulus that did not appear on
the prime display (Dalrymple-Alford and Budayr, 1966; Tipper, 1985).
The NP effect has been observed for a variety of stimuli and a variety of populations (for reviews,
see, e.g., Fox, 1995; Tipper, 2001; Frings et al., 2015). Unlike some other selection tasks (e.g., Stroop,
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flanker tasks), the NP task allows investigation of the fate of the
representation of previously encountered but ignored stimuli.
NP is commonly observed when the to-be-ignored distractor
is “selected against” a concurrent attended target. However,
further work has also reported reliable NP even in the absence
of distractor stimuli on the prime display (i.e., single-NP; e.g.,
Milliken et al., 1998; Frings and Wentura, 2005; Noguera et al.,
2007, 2015; Chao and Yeh, 2008).
There are at least two competing explanations for the NP
effect. On the one hand, it has been taken to imply that
successful selective attention to a target stimulus depends in
part on selective inhibition of any distractors present. This
forward-acting inhibitory account of NP is based on two
fundamental ideas: First, both relevant and irrelevant stimuli
are initially processed in parallel. Second, selection is a dual
process in which an excitatory mechanism acting to enhance
the processing of targeted information is complemented by an
inhibitory mechanism acting to suppress (and/or decouple from
potential effectors) the activation levels of the distractor’s internal
representations. The residual inhibition associated with the
distracting item is presumed to produce the delayed responding
(NP) to this stimulus when it appears as a target on a subsequent
probe display (Houghton et al., 1996). On the other hand, NP
may reflect a backward-acting process of episodic retrieval (e.g.,
Fox and de Fockert, 1998). On this account, NP occurs when the
current target triggers retrieval of a previous encounter with the
same stimulus, which on that occasion served as an irrelevant
distractor, causing a delay in the response selection process (e.g.,
Neill et al., 1992). Evidence has accumulated on both sides of
this debate, and has led to some compelling hybrid models
proposing how both forward-acting inhibition and backward-
acting retrieval processes could contribute to the effect (e.g., Kane
et al., 1997; Tipper, 2001). Yet, irrespective of this debate, there is
converging evidence to suggest that the processes that contribute
to NP are effortful and resource demanding. Thus, the NP effect
depends critically on the availability of cognitive control (working
memory) resources, which serve to minimize the processing of
distractor information (e.g., Lavie et al., 2004; de Fockert et al.,
2010; de Fockert, 2013).
Indirect evidence for this position is provided by studies on
cognitive aging, which tend to show that elderly participants are
disproportionally impaired compared to younger participants at
tasks that require active rejection of distracting information. For
example, by assessing Stroop interference and NP concurrently
in the same procedure, Mayas et al. (2012) found that relative to
younger participants, older adults showed not only an increased
Stroop interference, but also reduced NP from irrelevant
(distracting) stimuli, indicating that they failed to inhibit them.
Note, however, that such evidence for a link between cognitive
control resources and selective attention is mostly indirect, as a
reduction in working memory capacity (WMC) in the older (vs.
younger) groups is often assumed rather than directly measured
in these studies.
More direct evidence that cognitive control functions are
necessary for NP to occur comes from research showing that
NP is directly modulated by working memory load and/or
WMC (for recent reviews see Redick et al., 2007; de Fockert,
2013). By measuring distractor interference in a context of
varying working memory load (e.g., high vs. low mental load),
several studies have demonstrated that a to-be-ignored distractor
gives rise to reliable NP only under conditions of low memory
load. Under high memory load, NP is eliminated or is even
converted to positive priming (PP; e.g., Engle et al., 1995;
Chao and Yeh, 2008; de Fockert et al., 2010; see also Chao,
2011). Other studies seek correlations between WM span and
selective attention by comparing the performance of low vs. high
WM span groups. WM capacity is typically measured with a
complex span task, such as the Operation Span -Ospan- task
(e.g., Unsworth et al., 2005). In the Ospan task, participants
perform number calculations while adding to a list of words (or
letters) they keep in memory; working memory span is the sum of
all correctly recalled word (or letter) lists. Consistent individual
differences in a NP task as a function of WM capacity have
been reported, such that only high WM capacity participants
showed reliable NP, whereas low WM capacity participants did
not (e.g., Conway et al., 1999; see also Long and Prat, 2002).
Together, these findings suggest that having low WM capacity
has the same effects on NP as having a high load on working
memory.
It should be noted, however, that research so far examining
a dependence of NP on cognitive control (working memory)
resources, has used different versions of the identity NP
paradigm, in which the prime stimulus itself is repeated as
the target stimulus on the subsequent probe display. It thus
remains unclear whether a differential availability of control
resources (i.e., participants with high vs. low working memory
capacities) could modulate NP not only at a relatively low
feature (perceptual) level, but also at a more abstract (semantic)
level of representation. This issue was addressed in the present
research.
Traditionally, a central issue in research on the NP effect
concerns the level of representation at which it operates (Damian,
2000; see also Tipper, 1985). The reason for that interest is
that NP has usually been considered a relevant finding not
only in promoting dual conceptions of selective attention (i.e.,
excitatory mechanisms would be complemented by inhibitory
processes), but also in suggesting that an ignored stimulus
may undergo a deep level of processing, as proposed for
example by late-selection attention models (e.g., Deutsch and
Deutsch, 1963). Consequently, it would be critically important to
demonstrate that NP does not depend on the physical identity
between the prime and the target, and it can also generalize
between semantic associates belonging to the same semantic
category (cf. Neill and Mathis, 1998). In fact, Tipper (1985)
and Tipper and Driver (1988) demonstrated that NP could
generalize to the semantic associates of the prime stimulus (e.g.,
cat–dog). They explained this semantic NP effect by appealing
to a spreading prospective inhibition mechanism that mirrors
automatic spreading activation suggested to underlie semantic
PP from attended stimuli (e.g., Collins and Loftus, 1975; Neely,
1977). According to Tipper and Driver, when a prime distractor
is ignored, inhibition beginning at the central representation of
that stimulus would spread to related representations, lowering
their activation levels below baseline (see Houghton and Tipper,
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1994, for a different explanation of semantic NP in terms of
inhibitory processes in selective attention). Note that semantic
NP can also be accounted for by episodic retrieval theories
(Neill et al., 1992; Neill, 1997) by assuming that during prime
selection “not-respond” (or “to-be-ignored”) tags can be placed
not only on the distractor stimulus itself, but also on related
items activated by the distractor. As suggested by Neill (1997),
the current target stimulus would cue the retrieval of past
processing episodes involving similar stimuli. Accordingly, when
the retrieved episode includes information about the response
and/or relevance of that stimulus, semantic NP would occur if a
previously encoded item semantically related to the current target
had been ignored.
Although it is usually accepted that NP can also rely on
the semantic similarity between the prime distractor and the
probe target, the evidence of semantic NP has been elusive
thus far, especially when words are used as prime stimuli (e.g.,
Tipper and Driver, 1988; see Fox, 1995, for a review). Unlike
the NP effects from identity or spatial tasks, semantic NP
effects from prime words have often been weak and difficult to
replicate, with the observed effects being highly sensitive to minor
procedural/methodological differences, such as the strength -and
forward vs. backward direction- with which the prime and target
words are associated; or the type of probe task.
Still another factor that might be critical in explaining
differences in semantic NP effects across conditions and studies
is the existence of individual differences in attention control and
working memory capacities (WMC). As previously noted, it has
not been investigated yet whether the semantic NP effect could
critically depend on WMC. It remains possible that obtaining
contradicting semantic NP findings even under highly similar
task conditions could at least partly be due to differences between
studies regarding the differential proportion of participants
showing high vs. low WMC.
Note that in order to obtain a reliable semantic NP effect
it is not only necessary that the prime distractor is actively
ignored (as it is the case regarding identity NP). It is also
critical that the activation of its abstract semantic memory
representation spreads to the representations of semantically
related items, and that inhibition (or “to-be-ignored” or “not-
respond” tags) is also applied on these representations related
to the ignored prime. It is well established that prefrontal areas,
in particular the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), seem
to support not only attentional control and working memory
functions (e.g., active manipulation of task-relevant information,
and interference blocking of competing information), but it
also plays a role in semantic processing (e.g., Petersen et al.,
1988; Shivde and Thompson-Schill, 2004), particularly under task
conditions that encourage a strategic or controlled processing of
semantic information (e.g., high proportion of related prime-
target pairs; a long prime-target stimulus onset asynchrony -
SOA-; see for example, Hutchison, 2007).
Based on results of several priming studies in thought-
disordered schizophrenic patients, Spitzer and colleagues have
suggested that PFC could modulate not only controlled
processing, but also automatic semantic processing (e.g., Spitzer
et al., 1993; see also Kiefer et al., 2005). Schizophrenic patients
frequently exhibited increased semantic priming effects for
both directly (hen–egg) and indirectly (lemon [sour]–sweet)
related prime–target word pairs, compared with healthy control
subjects, particularly under conditions that minimize strategic
processes (i.e., at short prime-target SOA; a low relatedness
proportion –RP). According to these authors, PFC focuses
retrieval of semantic information to meaning aspects related
to the context, so that automatic spreading activation in
semantic networks reaches only closely related nodes (e.g.,
lemon– sour). Because of dysfunctional prefrontal information
processing in schizophrenic patients, spreading activation during
semantic access would be stronger and far-reaching, thus
resulting in increased direct and indirect automatic priming
effects.
Because individuals differ greatly in their PFC functioning
(Gazzaniga et al., 1998; Kane and Engle, 2002) and because
this difference can underlie individual differences not only
in attentional control and working memory tasks, but also
in semantic priming tasks, it not implausible that semantic
NP could be even more sensitive than identity NP to a
differential availability of cognitive (working memory) resources.
The present research addresses this issue.
Current Study
As noted above, research examining semantic NP from words
has usually produced smaller effects than those obtained from
identical prime-probe stimuli, with reliable semantic NP being
observed under some limited conditions. Furthermore, a sizeable
portion of previous studies have reported a failure to replicate
semantic NP from words (see Fox, 1995, for a review), such
that some authors have questioned whether semantic NP actually
exists (e.g., MacLeod et al., 2002). It is thus not surprising that
semantic NP is only barely mentioned in the recent review by
Frings et al. (2015; p. 1578).
Based on these considerations, it is important to establish
the boundary conditions under which consistent semantic
NP may be found. Over the last two decades, evidence has
accumulated that obtaining reliable semantic NP from words
critically depends on (i) instructing participants to actively
ignore the prime distractor (e.g., Ortells and Tudela, 1996;
Milliken et al., 1998); (ii) using a prime-probe SOA interval
long enough to allow an efficient engagement of controlled
attentional processes (e.g., Ortells et al., 2001; Noguera et al.,
2007); (iii) presenting related prime–target pairs that are both
categorically and associatively related (e.g., cat–dog; nose–mouth;
see for example Abad et al., 2003), particularly in the forward
direction (e.g., Hutchison, 2002); and (iv) requiring participants
to make a relatively demanding forced-choice task, such as lexical
decision or semantic categorization (instead of naming) on the
probe target (e.g., Richards, 1999; Ortells et al., 2001; Hutchison,
2002; Noguera et al., 2007).
In the present research we used a paradigm (Daza et al.,
2007; Noguera et al., 2007, 2015) that respects all the above
conditions, in which participants are required to make a lexical
decision (word/non-word) on a probe target that is centrally
presented either alone or along with a letter-string distractor
(depending on the experiment). The target display is preceded
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by a prime display containing a single central word (presented
briefly and post-masked), which on related trials (50% of word
trials) is associatively and categorically related to the upcoming
target (e.g., tiger–lion; face–eyes). On unrelated trials (50%
of word trials), the prime–target pairs are unrelated words
belonging to different semantic categories (e.g., tiger–face; eyes–
lion). Immediately before the prime display onset either YES
(in green) or NO (in red) is presented, varying randomly from
trial to trial. Participants are instructed that if they see YES they
should “attend to and remember” the following (prime) word,
as it would be tested in a subsequent memory task. However,
if they see NO they should actively ignore the following prime
word, as it would otherwise disrupt their memory for the “attend
to and remember” words1. Previous work (Noguera et al., 2007,
2015) has shown a consistent interaction between attentional
instructions and priming effects. The YES cue gave rise to reliable
semantic PP, while the NO cue produced reliable semantic NP,
regardless of whether the probe target was presented with or
without distractors.
Apart from replicating this pattern of results, the main
goal of the current work was to explore whether semantic NP
from ignored words depends on the availability of cognitive
control resources. Accordingly, participants with high vs. low
working memory capacities (as assessed by their performance in
several attentional control and complex span tasks) performed a
semantic NP task similar to that used by Noguera et al. (2007;
Experiment 4). To the extent that semantic NP depends on
WMC, we expected to find a reliable interaction between ignored
priming and WMC. Thus, the prime words that participants
were instructed to actively ignore should produce reliable
semantic NP only for high-WMC participants, with no NP
effect or even an opposite PP effect being found for low-WMC
participants.
By contrast, no reliable interaction of priming with WMC
was expected regarding the attended prime words. Although
our prime-target SOA (600 ms) seems to be long enough for
participants to consciously generate likely targets, the prime-
target relatedness proportion employed was 0.5, which is unlikely
to recruit effortful strategic processes (Neely, 1977, 1991). In
addition, the non-word trials may be considered unrelated
trials, as a non-word target was always preceded by a prime
word belonging to a different category. Hence the aggregate
probability that a prime word is followed by a semantically related
target is 0.33. In this case, the priming effects should mainly
reflect automatic spreading activation in semantic networks,
as participants could not reliably use the attended prime to
develop expectancy for specific related targets during the interval
between prime and target onset (e.g., Neely, 1991; Hutchison,
2007; Hutchison et al., 2014). To the extent that the attended
1While other NP studies have examined the impact of attentional instructions
on prime processing, the different instructions have been associated with either
different blocks or groups (e.g., Ortells and Tudela, 1996; Milliken et al., 1998).
Under these conditions, a differential priming pattern for the attended and ignored
primes might reflect some strategic difference between participants other than the
effects of the instructions per se. To avoid this possible confound, the instruction
either to attend or to ignore the single prime varied randomly from trial to trial
(Noguera et al., 2007, 2015).
priming effects in this task are mainly the result of automatic
processing mechanisms (i.e., spreading activation), they should
be insensitive to individual differences in WMC. We therefore
expect that the attended primes should produce reliable PP effects
of a similar size for both low-WMC and high-WMC participants
(namely, no reliable interaction between attended priming and
WMC).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants Screening for Working
Memory Capacity and Attention Control
A sample of 200 native Spanish speakers with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision were prescreened for WMC on the
basis of their performance on an automated versions of operation
and symmetry complex span tasks (see Unsworth et al., 2005,
2009 for more task details). These complex span tasks have
demonstrated good reliability and validity, and are strongly
predictive of a person’s complex cognition, fluid intelligence, or
attention control abilities.
The automated operation span task (AOSPAN; Unsworth
et al., 2005) requires participants to solve a series of simple
mathematical operations while trying to remember a variable
set of unrelated items. For example, the participant is shown an
operation such as “(3 × 1) −1 = ” for a period of time; the next
screen shows a digit such as 6, and the participant is to click on
the “yes” or “no” box on the screen to indicate whether the digit
is the correct answer to the arithmetic operation. The participant
is then shown a letter for 800 ms. After three to seven such items,
the participant views a matrix of letters on the screen, attempting
to recall the letters in the order in which they were presented (by
clicking them with mouse). Participants are encouraged to put
equal emphasis on math performance and on letter recall. The
number of operation-letter pairs per series varied from three to
seven (three series of each length are performed, and the order
of presentation was random, so that the participant could not
predict series length). The dependent measure, or global Aospan
score, is the sum of letters correctly recalled from series that
are recalled perfectly (all letters in their correct order with no
intrusions). The total possible score thus ranged from 0 to 75.
If accuracy on the mathematical operations was below 85%, the
subject was excluded. Subjects who scored 44 or higher were
classified as high span and those who scored 24 or lower were
classified as low span. These cutoffs reflect the upper and lower
quartiles of our 200-subject pool.
The structure of the automated symmetry span task
(ASYMSPAN; Unsworth et al., 2009) is similar to that of the
AOSPAN just described, with the following exceptions. First,
instead of remembering letters, subjects are presented with a
4 × 4 matrix of blank squares, with one square colored in red on
a given trial. Second, instead of solving mathematical problems,
subjects make vertical symmetry decisions about an 8 × 8 figure
composed of black and white squares. At recall, the subject must
indicate the location of the squares within the matrix that were
colored for that trial in the same order as they appeared by
clicking on the cells of an empty matrix. Finally, the list length can
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vary between two and five (with three trials of each list length), for
a total of 42 symmetry figures and square locations on the task.
The dependent measure, or global Asymspan score, is the number
of square locations recalled in the correct sequential order (with
no intrusions) across all trials. The total possible score thus
ranged from 0 to 42. Subjects who scored either 23 or higher, or
12 or lower, were classified as high low span, respectively. These
cutoffs reflect the upper and lower quartiles of our 200-subject
pool.
In addition to obtaining independent global scores in the
two span tasks for each participant, we also calculated a z-score
WMC composite. Performance on each task was transformed
into a z-score based on our database of over 200 scores. A z-
score WMC composite was created by averaging across the two
complex span tasks’ z-scores for each participant. Quartiles were
then computed from the averaged distribution, with z-scores of
+0.575 and −0.58 corresponding, respectively, to the upper and
lower quartiles of our 200-subject pool.
The participants also performed a version of the antisaccade
task (Hutchison, 2007; see also, Kane et al., 2001; Unsworth et al.,
2004). Previous work with this task has demonstrated differences
in groups thought to differ in WMC, such as older vs. younger
adults, schizophrenics or patients with lesions in the PFC vs.
healthy controls (e.g., de Jong, 2001; see Everling and Fischer,
1998, for a review). In this task, participants are told that an
asterisk will appear to the left or right of fixation, and immediately
followed by a target stimulus (O or Q). The latter appears either
on the same (prosaccade condition), or on the opposite side of
the screen (antisaccade condition), as the asterisk. Participants
were informed that their task in the antisaccade trials was to
look away from the flashed asterisk in order to identify the target
before it disappeared. Trials began with a white fixation (+)
presented on a gray background for either 1000 or 2000 ms.
Following the fixation, a white asterisk (∗) appeared 3◦ to the
left or right of fixation for 300 ms. Both asterisk location (left
or right) and asterisk delay (1000 or 2000 ms) varied randomly
on a trial-by-trial basis to prevent participants from anticipating
when or where the asterisk would appear. Following the asterisk,
the target appeared 3◦ to either the same (prosaccade block) or
the opposite side of fixation (antisaccade block) for 100 ms and
was immediately replaced by a backward pattern mask (##). The
pattern mask was displayed for 5,000 ms, during which time the
participants were to press either the Q or the O key to indicate
the identity of the target. The timing of the trials was designed
such that if participants accidentally made a saccade toward (as
opposed to away from) the asterisk, they would not have time
to plan and execute another saccade to the opposite side of the
screen and reach the target. Participants completed a total of 128
trials: 64 trials (16 practice) for the antisaccade block, and 64
trials for the prosaccade block, with the order of blocks being
counterbalanced across participants.
Participants
Twenty-four low (19 women) and twenty-four high (19 women)
WMC participants, who had scored respectively in the lower
(<24) and upper (>44) quartiles in the AOSPAN task of our 200-
subject database, were recruited for the lexical decision study. The
z-score WMC composite for each participant in the high-WMC
and low-WMC groups fell also within the upper (>+0.575) and
lower (<−0.58) quartiles compared to our database (see Table 1
below). Participants were between 18 and 51 years old (M = 21.9,
SD= 6.7 for lows; M = 21.9, SD= 4.8 for highs), and all of them
received credit toward course requirements as compensation.
All participants signed a written consent after the nature and
the consequences of the experiment had been explained. The
experiment was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki.
Stimuli and Apparatus
The stimulus set was similar to that used by Noguera et al. (2007;
see also Noguera et al., 2015). It consisted of 48 concrete and
familiar Spanish nouns of 4–7 letters length (16 per category)
belonging to four semantic categories (geographical features and
atmospheric phenomena, foods, animals, and body parts; see
Appendix A), which were selected from the intra-categorical
associative norms published by Callejas et al. (2003). From that
48-word set, 24 items were presented only as primes and the
remaining 24 were presented only as targets (a different word
set was presented during practice trials). A further set of 24-
words (six from each category) of length 4–7 letters was selected,
and one letter from each word was changed to produce an
orthographically regular, pronounceable non-word.
All stimuli were presented on a computer screen at a viewing
distance of approximately 60 cm. Stimulus delivery and response
recordings were controlled by E-prime software (Psychology
Software Tools Inc.2). Each trial consisted of a sequence of nine
critical displays (see Figure 1): Blank screen, fixation, instruction,
fixation, blank screen, prime, mask, blank screen, and target.
The fixation display consisted of a white asterisk (∗) presented
at the center of the screen on a dark gray background. The
instruction display consisted of either the word “YES” printed in
green or the word “NO” printed in red and presented just above
2www.pstnet.com/eprime
TABLE 1 | Summary statistics for performance in the complex span
(Aospan, Asymspan, and z-score composite) and attentional control
(antisaccade and prosaccade trials) tasks by Low-WMC and High-WMC
groups.
Low-WMC Group High-WMC Group
M SD M SD
Complex Span tasks
Aospan score 15.38 6.53 52.83 7.68
Asymspan score 7.13 4.50 23.67 8.30
z-score composite −1.10 0.31 +1.01 0.33
Antisaccade task
Antisaccade trials
RT (ms) 726 165 573 149
AC (%) 0.77 0.12 0.91 0.12
Prosaccade trials
RT (ms) 535 157 471 106
AC (%) 0.96 0.062 0.096 0.098
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FIGURE 1 | Example of the temporal sequence of events when the target is a “word” presented for the instruction of Attending to and remembering
(“YES” printed in green) the prime word. The word stimuli shown here for related and unrelated trials have been translated from Spanish to English. Stimuli are
not drawn to scale.
fixation. Both the prime and the probe displays consisted of a
single uppercase letter string (4, 5, 6, or 7 letters) presented at the
center of the screen, and subtending an average visual angle of
about 2.21◦ wide and 0.49◦ high. The mask display consisted of a
series of ampersands (“&&&&&&”) at the center of the screen.
Participants responded by pressing either the “m” or “c” keys,
indicating whether the target letter string was either a meaningful
word or a non-word. Mappings of word/non-word decisions and
correct key (m or c) were counterbalanced across participants.
Design and Procedure
General task instructions were displayed on the monitor and also
orally delivered. The timing of the events was as follows (see
Figure 1): (1) Blank screen presented for a random duration
between 1000 and 1500 ms; (2) Fixation display (∗), presented
for 500 ms; (3) Instruction display, consisting of either the word
“SI” (yes) in green or “NO” (no) in red at the center of the screen
for 250 ms. The participants were instructed that if they saw
“YES” they should “attend to and remember” the following word
as it would be tested in a subsequent memory task. However, if
they saw “NO” then they should “ignore” the following prime
word, as it was a distractor that would disrupt their memory for
the “attend to and remember” words. The attentional cue varied
randomly from trial to trial; (4) Fixation display (∗) presented for
800ms; (5) Blank screen for 800 ms; (6) Prime display containing
a single word displayed at fixation for 50 ms; (7) Masking display
presented for 50 ms; (8) Blank screen of 500 ms (thus resulting in
a prime–target stimulus onset asynchrony – SOA – of 600 ms); (9)
Probe display containing a single target letter string for 300 ms,
on which the participants made a lexical decision (word vs.
non-word). The participants were told to press the appropriate
response key (m or c) as quickly and accurately as possible, with
the computer emitting a 500-ms beep if the participants made an
error.
Participants took part in a single session (lasting about 25 min)
consisting of 24 practice trials (16 word and 8 non-word trials)
followed by 144 experimental trials (divided into 2 consecutive
blocks of 72 trials each), consisting of 48 trials containing a non-
word target and 96 trials containing a word target. All the 48
non-word trials could be viewed as “unrelated” trials, because
every non-word target was preceded by a prime word belonging
to a different category to that from which the non-word had
been created3. Of the 96 word trials, the prime and target words
belonged to different categories on 48 (unrelated) trials, and they
were highly associated category members on 48 (related) trials.
On half of both the 48-related and the 48-unrelated word trials,
participants were instructed to “attend to and remember” the
prime word preceding the target (attended trials), whereas on
the other half they were instructed to actively “ignore” the prime
word preceding the target (ignored trials). Different prime words
were always presented on both “attended” and “ignored” trials,
with the prime words assigned to each instruction type being
counterbalanced across participants. For each participant, every
prime word (e.g., LION) appeared two times on non-word trials
3We presented fewer non-word (48) than word trials (96) in order to reduce the
“non-word ratio” (i.e., the ratio of trials on which a target is a non-word given
that the target is unrelated to its word prime), which would in turn minimize the
involvement of retrospective semantic-matching strategies in our priming task (see
Neely, 1991 for a more detailed discussion on this issue; see also Ortells et al., 2003;
Noguera et al., 2007, for a similar task procedure). Thus, given an unrelated prime-
target trial (48 word trials + 48 non-word trials = 96 trials of the total), there was
the same probability for the target to be either a “non-word” (48/96) or a “word”
(48/96).
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(i.e., the prime word was followed by two different unrelated
non-words), and four times (either as a to-be-attended or as a
to-be-ignored prime) on word trials: Twice being followed by a
highly associated target word from the same semantic category
(i.e., the first ranked exemplar on forward direction in the norms
of Callejas et al., 2003; e.g., LION-TIGER), and twice by an
unrelated target word belonging to a different category (e.g.,
LION-HAND).
The main factors manipulated in the experiment were WMC,
manipulated between-participants at two levels (High vs. Low
capacity), Instructions (Attend to vs. Ignore), and Prime-
Target Relatedness (Related vs. Unrelated). The last two factors
were manipulated within-participants with a different random
order for each individual. Half of the trials were “Attend
to and remember” and half were “Ignore.” Within each of
these conditions, half of the target words were related to the
preceding prime words and the remaining half was unrelated.
The breakdown of the trials was the same for the non-word
targets but only the trials containing word targets were analyzed.
Participants were informed that after completing the
experiment, they would carry out a recognition task about the
previously attended words. Although participants were told
that there was only one recognition test, two tests were actually
presented, one about the attended and the other about the
ignored items. They had to classify each word as “new” or “old”
depending on whether or not the word had appeared in the
experiment. A total of 48 words were presented: 24 “old” words
presented as either attended or ignored words on the prime
display, and 24 “new” items (not previously presented) belonging
to the same four semantic categories mentioned above. Each
participant received a different random ordering of the old and
new items.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Working Memory (Complex Span) and
Attention Control (Antisaccade) Tasks
Descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) for
performance in both the two complex span tasks (global span and
z-composite scores), and the antisaccade task (RTs and accuracy
in the prosaccade and antisaccade blocks) for both high-WMC
and low-WMC groups are presented in Table 1.
As can be seen in Table 1, high-WMC individuals performed
significantly better than low-WMC individuals in the two
complex span tasks [Aospan: t(46)= 18.1; Asymspan: t(46)= 9.6;
z-score composite: t(46) = 17.6; all ps < 0.001]. High-WMC
participants also reliably outperformed low-span participants
in both response latencies [t(46) = −3.34, p = 0.002] and
accuracy [t(46) = 4.52, p < 0.001] for the antisaccade trials. In
contrast, high- and low-WMC participants performed virtually
identically in the prosaccade trials where fast and accurate target
identification would be aided by a relatively automatic orienting
response. Thus, the differential performance of the two WMC
groups does not simply reflect a generalized performance deficit
in low- compared with high-WMC subjects, such as lack of
attention or slower processing-speed.
These impressions were confirmed by results of further
mixed analyses of variance in which WMC (high vs. low)
was treated as a between-participants factor, and saccade type
(antisaccade vs. prosaccade trials) as the within-participants
variable. The ANOVAs yielded reliable main effects of both WMC
and saccade type, and more interestingly, a reliable interaction
between these two variables in both RTs [F(1,46) = 9.25,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.18] and Accuracy [F(1,46) = 17.9, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.28] in the antisaccade condition. The analyses of these
interactions demonstrated that high- and low-WMC individuals
showed a fairly similar performance on the relatively automatic
prosaccade trials. In clear contrast, they reliably differed in the
antisaccade trials, with low-span participants having significantly
longer latencies [t(46) = 3.34, p = 0.002] and reduced
accuracy [t(46) = 4.52, p < 0.001] compared to high-span
participants.
The pattern of inter-individual task performance differences
was also assessed by a correlation analysis for the entire sample
of 48 subjects. Verbal and visuospatial span tasks were highly
correlated (r = 0.78, p < 0.001), suggesting that individual
differences in WMC reflect predominantly domain-general
rather domain-specific resources. In addition, high-WMC was
correlated with a better performance in the antisaccade trials
for both response latencies [Aospan: r = −0.37, p = 0.009;
Asymspan: r = −0.51, p < 0.001; z-composite: r = −0.46,
p < 0.001], and accuracy [Aospan: r = 0.49; Asymspan: r = 0.63;
z-composite: r = 0.59, all ps < 0.001]. In contrast, WCM
measures did not reliably predict either latency or accuracy in the
prosaccade trials4.
Priming Task
Trials containing an incorrect response (2.4% of trials) or
those with reaction times (RTs) falling more than 2.5 standard
deviations from the overall mean RT (2.1% of trials) were
removed from analyses. Mean RTs from correct word trial
responses were calculated for the participants in each WM
capacity group (High vs. Low) as a function of Instructions
(Attend to vs. Ignore), and Prime-Target Relatedness (Related vs.
4Several researchers have recently recommended the use of the partial instead of
the absolute (global)-scoring method to analyze performance on complex span
tasks (e.g., Redick et al., 2012). A partial score reflects the sum of items recalled
in the correct serial position, regardless of whether an entire trial was recalled
correctly. It has been suggested that relative to absolute-scoring, the partial-scoring
method shows higher test-retest correlations, higher internal consistencies and
correlations among the different complex span task. Accordingly, partial scores
in ospan and symmetry span tasks we also computed for each participant. The
overall result pattern was very similar to that found with absolute or global span
scores. Namely, high-WMC participants performed significantly better than low-
WMC individuals in both span tasks [Aospan: t(46)= 11.5; Asymspan: t(46)= 10;
z-partial composite: t(46)= 14.7; all ps< 0.001]. The partial span scores of the two
tasks were again highly correlated among them (r= 0.79, p< 0.001). All the partial
WMC scores reliably correlated with performance in the antisaccade condition for
both response latencies [Aospan: r = −0.35, p = 0.002; Asymspan: r = −0.49,
p < 0.001; z-partial composite: r = −0.44, p = 0.002], and accuracy [Aospan:
r = 0.50; Asymspan: r = 0.61; z-partial composite: r = 0.60, all ps < 0.001]. In
contrast, no reliable correlation was found between any of partial WCM scores
and either response latency or accuracy in the prosaccade block. Given that most
prior work addressing the relationship between WMC and selective attention tasks
has relied on absolute-scoring scores, all analyses reported in the current paper are
based on the absolute scoring rather than on partial scoring method in order to
remain consistent with prior work.
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Unrelated). Two analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted,
one with the participants (F1) and other with words (F2) as the
random factor. Mean RTs and mean error rates as a function of
WM Capacity, Instructions and Relatedness are shown in Table 2.
The error rate analysis revealed only a significant main
effect of Relatedness [Related = 1.6%; Unrelated = 3.3%;
(F1(1,46)= 9.71, p= 0.003, η2 = 0.17; F2(1,46)= 5.39, p= 0.025,
η2 = 0.11].
The analysis of RTs showed a significant main effect
for Relatedness [Related = 498 ms; Unrelated = 531 ms;
F1(1,46) = 22.98, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.23; F2(1,46) = 14.34,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.24], which interacted with Instructions
[F1(1,46) = 25.53, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.36; F2(1,46) = 12.63,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.22]. More interestingly, there was a reliable
three-way interaction between Instructions, Relatedness, and
WMC [F1(1,46) = 11.54, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.201; F2(1,46) = 7.01,
p = 0.011, η2 = 0.13]. Further analyses of this interaction
revealed a differential priming pattern from attended vs. ignored
primes as a function of WMC (see Figure 2).
The attended prime gave rise to reliable PP effects for
both High-WMC [+70 ms; F1(1,23) = 28.97, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.56; F2(1,23) = 16.13, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.41] and Low-
WMC participants [+50 ms; F1(1,23) = 16.5, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.42; F2(1,23) = 11.72, p = 0.002, η2 = 0.34]. This
pattern was as predicted. With a relatedness proportion below
0.50, the semantic priming effects would be mainly driven
by automatic spreading activation, rather than controlled
expectancy generation, regardless of whether a short or longer
prime-target SOA is used (Neely, 1991; Kiefer et al., 2005;
Hutchison et al., 2014). This view is supported by the absence of a
reliable correlation between the attended priming effects and any
WMC measure (Aospan, Asymspan, z-composite).
Regarding the ignored primes, a differential (opposite)
priming pattern as a function of WMC was found, as revealed
by a reliable interaction between Ignored Priming and WMC
[F1(1,46) = 11.54, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.201; F2(1,46) = 9.89,
p = 0.003, η2 = 0.18]. Further analyses of this interaction
revealed that the ignored primes produced reliable PP in
TABLE 2 | Mean (SD) reaction times (in ms), and error percentages (in %)
as a function of Working Memory Capacity (High vs. Low capacity),
Instructions (Attend to vs. Ignore the prime), and Prime-target
Relatedness (Related vs. Unrelated).
Instructions
Attend to Ignore
Low-WMC Group
Unrelated 515 (108.1) 510 (153.7)
3.5 (0.06) 4.9 (0.07)
Related 459 (122.5) 474 (164.2)
1.6 (0.03) 2.1 (0.03)
High-WMC Group
Unrelated 574 (211.2) 523 (162.3)
1.7 (0.04) 2.4 (0.05)
Related 504 (215.1) 553 (183.1)
1.0 (0.01) 2.5 (0.05)
FIGURE 2 | Semantic priming effects (unrelated minus related) for
Attended and Ignored primes for High-WMC and Low-WMC
participants. The vertical lines depict the standard error of priming scores for
each condition. Significant contrasts are highlighted by asterisks (∗p < 0.05;
∗∗p < 0.01).
Low-WMC individuals [+36 ms; F1(1,23) = 7.95, p = 0.01,
η2 = 0.26; F2(1,23)= 5.54, p= 0.027, η2 = 0.19], but an opposite
NP effect in High-WMC individuals [−30 ms; F1(1,23) = 6.69,
p = 0.017, η2 = 0.225; F2(1,23) = 4.42, p = 0.047, η2 = 0.16].
Given the finding of 36 ms facilitation from ignored primes in
the low WMC group, we directly compared this to the 50 ms
facilitation from the attended primes in the same group, and
found it not to reach significance [t(23) = 1.36, p > 0.19]. Thus
the low WMC group showed only an unreliable reduction in
positive semantic priming following the ignore cue, compared to
the very reliable semantic NP shown by the high WMC group.
Further evidence in support of a dependence of semantic
NP on WMC is the finding that the ignored priming effects
(unlike the attended priming effects) did reliably correlate with
all the WMC measures in our study [Aospan: r = −0.40,
p = 0.005; Asymspan: r = −0.41, p = 0.004; z-composite:
r = −0.33, p = 0.02]. These results replicate and extend some
previous findings (e.g., Engle et al., 1995; Conway et al., 1999;
Chao and Yeh, 2008; de Fockert et al., 2010) in showing that
a differential availability of cognitive control (WM) resources
reliably modulates NP not only at the feature (perceptual) level
but also at a more abstract (semantic) level of representation.
An inspection of Table 2 shows that whereas in the low WMC
group RTs to unrelated targets were fairly similar for attend and
ignore conditions, the same did not occur in the high WMC
group. In this latter case, response latencies to unrelated targets
in the ignore condition were reliably slower [F(1,23) = 5.8,
p = 0.025, η2 = 0.19] than those in the attend condition.
One could argue that this differential response pattern in the
unrelated condition could be at least partially responsible for
the reliable priming by instructions interaction that was found
in the High-WMC group. While the source these differences
remains unclear, it is very likely they are mainly due to non-
systematic (random) between-participants variability. Note that
in some prior single-prime NP studies (e.g., Ortells et al.,
2003; Noguera et al., 2007; see also Daza et al., 2007) a fairly
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similar interaction between Instruction and Relatedness (and
ignored NP effects of a similar size across experiments) is found
regardless of whether RTs to unrelated targets are either different
or fairly similar between attend and ignore instructions (see
for example Ortells et al., 2003; Experiments 1 vs. 2; see also
Noguera et al., 2007; Experiments 2 vs. 5). Second and more
importantly, a re-examination of our data in the High-WMC
group revealed that in 3 of the 24 participants RTs to the
unrelated targets were much slower for the attended than for the
ignored condition (2 of the 3 showed NP effects from the ignored
primes). We then conducted further ANOVAs in which the
data from these three participants were removed. The results of
these new analyses again revealed a reliable three-way interaction
between Instructions, Relatedness, and WMC [F1(1,43) = 10.7,
p= 0.002, η2 = 0.20; F2(1,46)= 5.97, p= 0.018, η2 = 0.12]. Even
more importantly, in the High-WMC group the Instructions by
Relatedness interaction was again significant [F1(1,20) = 29.64,
p = 0.001, η2 = 0.201; F2(1,23) = 17.65, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.43],
with the attended prime producing reliable PP [+60 ms;
F1(1,20)= 19.9, p< 0.001, η2 = 0.50; F2(1,23)= 7.82, p= 0.010,
η2 = 0.25] and the ignored primes reliable NP [−36 ms;
F1(1,20) = 8.8, p = 0.008, η2 = 0.31; F2(1,23) = 4.43, p = 0.046,
η2 = 0.16]. But interestingly, whereas RT differences between
instruction types for related targets were very similar to those
found with 24 participants [Attend = 477 ms; Ignore = 551 ms;
F1(1,20) = 17.93, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.47; F2(1,23) = 10.34,
p = 0.004, η2 = 0.31], the RT differences between attend and
ignore instructions for the unrelated targets now failed to reach
significance [Attend = 537 ms; Ignore = 515 ms; F1(1,20) = 1.9,
p > 0.18; F2 < 1]. In addition, the correlation analysis for the
reduced sample of 45 participants again showed that the ignored
priming effects (but not the attended priming effects) did reliably
correlate with all the WMC measures [Aospan: r = −0.50,
Asymspan: r = −0.48; z-composite: r = −0.51, all ps < 0.001].
On this basis we would argue that the reliable interaction between
Instructions and Relatedness does mainly depend on differences
in WMC.
On the other hand, note that whereas Low-WMC individuals
were overall faster, but less accurate in the priming task
(RT = 489 ms; error rate = 3.2) than the high-WMC group
(RT = 539 ms; error rate 1.7), the main effect of WMC was not
statistically significant either in RTs or in error rates analyses.
These results provide further evidence that general processing
speed is not the mechanism responsible for the differential
performance of the two WMC groups in our study.
Prime Recognition Task
The recognition scores for both the attended and ignored primes
deviated significantly (p < 0.05) from zero. The analysis of
recognition scores showed a reliable main effect for Instructions
[F(1,46) = 44.9, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.49], such that they were
higher for the attended (d′ = 3.16) than for the ignored
primes (d′ = 1.78), thus providing further evidence that the
attentional instructions did indeed influence the processing of
the primes. The main effect of WM Capacity was also significant
[F(1,46) = 5.82, p = 0.02, η2 = 0.12], such that the recognition
scores were reliably higher for High-WMC (d′ = 2.94) than for
Low-WMC participants (d′ = 2.011). Moreover, the interaction
between Instructions and WM Capacity was also significant
[F(1,46) = 4.39, p = 0.043, η2 = 0.043]. This was due to the fact
that the differences between high- and low-WMC participants
on prime recognition was significant for the attended [High-
WMC = 3.84; Low-WMC = 2.48; t(46) = 3.68, p = 0.001],
but not for the ignored primes [High-WMC = 2.04; Low-
WMC = 1.54; t(46) = 1.01, p > 0.31]. Consistent with the above
findings are the results of the correlation analysis, which showed
that the recognition scores for only the attended primes reliably
correlated with all the WMC span scores [Aospan: r = 0.43,
p= 0.002; Asymspan: r = 0.41, p= 0.004; z-composite: r = 0.44,
p = 0.02]. These results suggests that a higher WMC was
associated with an increased recognition of primes words that
participants were instructed to attend and remember.
On the other hand, despite the reliable interaction between
Instructions and WM Capacity, we also found that both high-
WMC and low-WMC individuals performed reliably better
for the attended than for the ignored primes [High-WMC:
Attended = 3.84; Ignored = 2.04; t(46) = 5.5, p < 0.001;
Low-WMC: Attended = 2.48; Ignored = 1.54; t(46) = 3.8,
p = 0.001]. This is a relevant finding in demonstrating that the
fairly similar PP effects from the attended and ignored primes
that were observed in the low-WMC group, cannot be explained
in terms of a lesser ability to follow the different instructions
and/or to switch attention between them during the priming
task.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The current study had two main goals. The first goal was to
replicate the differential semantic priming pattern (positive vs.
negative) that was found by Noguera et al. (2007, 2015). As noted
in the Introduction, the evidence of semantic NP from prime
words has been elusive thus far, such that some authors have
questioned the existence of the effect (e.g., MacLeod et al., 2002;
see also Frings et al., 2015). Therefore, we consider it important
to demonstrate that a consistent semantic NP from words can
be found as long as several boundary conditions are fulfilled.
The second and more important goal was to investigate whether
semantic NP from single prime words could critically depend on
the availability of cognitive control (working memory) resources.
To this end, individuals high and low in WMC (as assessed by
their performance in complex span and attention control tasks)
performed a semantic NP task similar to that of Noguera et al.
(2007; Experiment 4). They were instructed to either attend to or
ignore a briefly presented single prime word that was followed by
either a semantically related or unrelated target word on which
participants made a lexical decision task.
Given the 50% prime-target relatedness proportion on word
trials, it is highly unlikely that participants could strategically use
the attended prime to develop expectancy for a specific related
target word (Neely, 1991; Hutchison, 2007; Hutchison et al.,
2014). Consequently, we predicted that the attended priming
effects would not greatly affected by individual differences in
WMC (i.e., no reliable interaction between attended priming and
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WMC). In contrast, to the extent that semantic NP depends on
WMC, we expected that the ignored primes would give rise to
reliable NP only in high-WMC but not in low-WMC participants
(i.e., a reliable interaction between ignored priming and WMC).
As predicted, we found that individual differences in WMC
mainly affected the processing of the ignored (irrelevant) primes,
but not the processing of the attended (relevant) primes: Whereas
positive semantic priming was found in both participant groups,
reliable semantic NP was shown only by the high WMC group.
In stark contrast, the low WMC participants showed a PP effect
from ignored primes. Indeed, this facilitatory effect was only
slightly reduced compared to that generated by the attended
primes, and the difference (14 ms.) was not significant. However,
on the prime recognition task the low WMC group did show
a reliable difference between attended and ignored primes, and
overall, only the former condition showed a correlation with
WMC. This supports the view that encoding of attended items
into memory for a later recognition test is an active process
which depends on WMC. At least for the low WMC group,
ignoring an item for memory encoding appears to be more of a
passive process, a decision not to engage the (effortful) encoding
mechanism on a stimulus that is otherwise fully processed
(leading to semantic facilitation). On the basis of the semantic
NP results, the high WMC group appears to have the capacity
to engage a more active, inhibitory, processing of to-be-ignored
primes, suppressing the spread of activation through the semantic
network.
As noted in the Introduction, the NP effect has been examined
in great detail because it provides a window into the processes
involved in selective attention. Note that the task requirement of
selecting a target against distractors is retained in the standard
NP procedure, in which participants are presented with couplets
of prime and probe displays containing at least two stimuli,
the to-be-responded target and the to-be-ignored distractor. It
thus makes sense that attentional selection of a target against
its distractor is a critical aspect in theories of NP, including the
inhibition account (Tipper, 1985, 2001; Houghton and Tipper,
1994; Houghton et al., 1996) and the retrieval account (Neill
et al., 1992; Neill, 1997; Neill and Mathis, 1998). According to
the inhibition account of NP, the principal factor underlying NP
is the suppression of the competing distractor by an inhibitory
mechanism in the selection process of the prime display.
According to the retrieval account, response to a probe target
is hampered when its presentation retrieves a tag incompatible
with the current behavioral goal, such as “do not respond”. In
both accounts, selection in prime trials would lead to either the
inhibition of the distractor or a tag associated with the distractor.
At first sight, obtaining NP from a single ignored prime
(single-prime NP) would run counter to the traditionally
accepted assumption that such an effect occurs because of a
reaction to the distractor interference in selective attention
situations. As pointed out by Milliken et al. (1998), because
selection was not required during the presentation of a single
prime stimulus (i.e., there was no target to which participants
responded during prime presentation), the prime was not
selected against, and hence not inhibited. It could, however, be
argued that in an experimental procedure requiring participants
to “ignore” the first (i.e., the prime) of the two stimuli presented
in a rapid temporal sequence, the act of ignoring a single
prime might involve the same inhibitory (or “do-not-respond”
tagging) mechanisms that can actively suppress distracting items
presented in irrelevant spatial locations on more conventional NP
tasks. In this view, single-prime NP could also be explained in
terms of selective attention processes, if the assumption is made
that selective inhibition (or do-not-respond tagging) acting on
pre-activated internal (abstract) representations of a prime word
can operate not only under “spatial” co-ordinates (i.e., where to
attend vs. ignore), but also under a “temporal” (i.e., when to
attend vs. ignore) dimension (see Tipper, 2001, for a similar line
of argument).
On the other hand, the dependence of NP effects on the
presence of distractor stimuli in the probe display has been
usually found only for tasks such as letter identification (e.g.,
Moore, 1994) or word (or color) naming (e.g., Milliken et al.,
1998; Neill and Kahan, 1999). But when a (perhaps much more
demanding) forced-choice binary task, such as a lexical decision
or a semantic categorization is used on the probe trials, there
are numerous previous reports of reliable NP even if probe
distractors are absent (e.g., Yee, 1991; Ortells and Tudela, 1996;
Richards, 1999; Ortells et al., 2001; Abad et al., 2003; Daza et al.,
2007; Noguera et al., 2007, 2015).
While the current study was not mainly intended to investigate
the underlying mechanism of NP, our findings of reliable
semantic NP for high but not for low WMC individuals can
be well accommodated by inhibitory accounts of NP, which
assume that forward-acting attentional inhibition is resource
demanding. Thus, a lower WMC could be associated to a lesser
ability of otherwise-engaged control mechanisms to effectively
inhibit and reject the processing of the to-be- ignored primes,
thus explaining the lack of NP in the low-WMC group. This
latter finding does not necessarily imply an absence of inhibition
(or attention control) abilities in low-WMC individuals. Recent
working memory research on normal aging (e.g., Gazzaley et al.,
2008; Jost et al., 2011) have reported evidence that the selective
deficit in suppressing task-irrelevant information during working
memory encoding in older adults, would be slowed or delayed
rather than generally impaired. Whether low-WMC individuals
could show semantic NP from ignored primes (or even perform
equivalently to high-WMC subjects) if a longer prime-target SOA
had been used in our task remains an interesting issue for future
research.
The dependence of semantic NP on WMC, as well as
the reliable correlation between WMC scores and the ignored
priming effects that we observed in the present research would
also be consistent with both the inhibition (Hasher et al.,
1999, 2007) and the executive attention (Engle and Kane,
2004) theories of working memory. The former account states
that older adults and individuals low in WMC primarily have
impairment in the ability to reduce (inhibit) interference from
task-irrelevant information. The second account assumes that
individual differences in WMC would mainly reflect variation
in a domain-general attention control ability, needed to actively
maintain task relevant representations in the face of distraction
(e.g., sustain the task goal and constrain the focus of attention
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to relevant target items). Our findings that the ignored primes
produced semantic NP only in the high-WMC group could
thus be attributed to their better ability to either inhibit
the ignored (irrelevant) information (Hasher et al., 2007), or
maintain task relevant information in an active state and to
block and inhibit irrelevant representations from gaining access
to WM. There are some recent demonstrations that individuals
high in WMC also exhibit improved performance on several
memory tasks requiring controlled search abilities, such a
free recall, cued recall, or item recognition when recollection
and not familiarity is needed. Unsworth and Engle (2007),
Unsworth and Spillers (2010) have proposed a dual-component
(maintenance/retrieval) model, which can be viewed as an
outgrowth of the executive attention account. According to
this view, WMC would be composed of both attention control
abilities (e.g., active maintenance in the face of distraction)
and secondary memory abilities (controlled search), which
are necessary to transfer information in and out of working
memory. Although our prime recognition task mainly aimed
to check the effectiveness of our instruction manipulation, the
finding that the attended (and to be remembered) primes were
better recognized by high-WMC than by low-WMC participants
would also be consistent with this maintenance/retrieval
theory.
Further evidence in support of both inhibitory and attention
control theories of WMC is provided by the results in the
antisaccade task. In our study, both verbal and visuospatial span
scores showed reliable correlations with response latency and
accuracy in the antisaccade, but not in the prosaccade trials.
In fact, high- and low-span individuals showed a fairly similar
performance on the prosaccade trials, but not on the antisaccade
trials, with the low-span group showing longer latencies (and a
lesser accuracy) than the high-span group (see Table 1). This
pattern replicates that obtained in some previous studies, at least
under experimental conditions that make minimal demands on
cognitive control, as is the case when the prosaccade and the
antisaccade trials are presented across different blocks (Kane
et al., 2001; Unsworth et al., 2004; the present study). Under
these conditions, it has been suggested that individual differences
in working memory span would mainly reflect differences
in suppression (inhibition) of prepotent responses (reflexive
saccade), rather than in directing the focus of attention (looking
forward the flashing cue), which is thought to rely on an
exogenous, automatic attentional-capture that does not require
the recruitment of executive control. Note also that the absence
of significant differences in overall reaction times between the two
WMC groups for both the antisaccade trials and the priming task,
clearly demonstrates that the differential performance of the two
WMC groups in our study cannot be attributed to a generalized
performance deficit in low- compared with high-WMC subjects,
such as slower responding.
Whereas the findings of reliable semantic NP for high-WMC
but not for low-WMC individuals are consistent with inhibitory
(and attention control) accounts, they are more difficult to
explain by a strict episodic retrieval account of NP. To the extent
that the retrieval of prior episodic traces, which contributes to
the NP effect, is usually assumed to be automatic (Logan, 1988),
it remains unclear why a differential WMC should modulate
an automatic backward-acting retrieval process. It could be
argued that differences in the availability of cognitive control
resources might affect the processes involved in labeling or
tagging the prime stimulus as more or less relevant. If a lower
WMC resulted in the ignored prime being less clearly labeled as
irrelevant on the prime display, then retrieval of episodic traces
associated with these primes would be less likely to interfere
with responses to the probe target, and thus these primes would
produce less NP (or even PP) compared with ignored primes
that were more successfully labeled as to-be-rejected distractors
by participants showing higher working memory capacities.
Note, however, that if low-WMC individuals were less able to
mark the to-be-ignored primes as irrelevant, then they should
also produce recognition scores for these stimuli that are fairly
similar to those for the attended primes. But this was clearly
not the case in the present research. We found instead that the
recognition of ignored primes was reliably impaired for both
high- and low-span participants. This latter finding also argues
against the possibility that low-WMC participants had more
difficulty than high-WMC participants to understand and/or
follow the different attention instructions (attend vs. ignore) in
our study.
The distinction between forward-acting attentional inhibition
and backward-acting episodic retrieval theories of NP can
be viewed as being somewhat similar to the distinction
between proactive and reactive control, which was originally
proposed by Braver and colleagues to account for impaired
cognitive control exhibited in schizophrenia patients and older
adults (e.g., Braver et al., 2001). Proactive control involves
maintaining goal information in an accessible state so as
to direct attention toward goal-relevant stimuli and away
from potential internal and external distractions. This form
of cognitive control is effortful and preparatory in nature, as
uses predictive cues to prepare for a response to a specific
upcoming target. In contrast, reactive control is a backward-
acting process that is automatically triggered by target onset
and involves retrieving prior contextual (e.g., goal) information
from long-term memory. In contrast to proactive control, the
reactive form of control does not require continuous effort or
monitoring of the environment, but instead involves using a
target stimulus to retrieve appropriate actions from long-term
memory.
The task frequently used to assess this dual-control model is
the AX-Continuous Performance Test (AX-CPT), which requires
a response to a specific probe target (X letter) only if it follows
a specific cue (A letter), and to withhold responses otherwise
(e.g., an X letter preceded by a B letter). AX targets occur on
70% of all letter sequences, so a strong expectancy to make
a target response is created when the letter A is presented.
Proactive control in this paradigm involves maintaining the A
cue in working memory and using it to maintain an expectancy
to make an X response to the following stimulus. In contrast,
reactive control involves using the probe (X) to retrieve the
preceding cue from memory and is demonstrated by longer
reaction times (or increased errors) in rejecting X targets that
were preceded by other cues. Across numerous studies, Braver
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et al. have provided evidence for reduced proactive control
among older adults and individuals with schizophrenia, relative
to healthy young adults (see Braver et al., 2007; Braver, 2012, for
reviews). Some recent AX-CPT studies have also demonstrated
that healthy young adults high in WMC are more likely to
efficiently use proactive strategies than low-WMC individuals
(e.g., Redick and Engle, 2011; Hutchison et al., 2014; Redick,
2014).
The assumption that individuals vary greatly in their ability
to maintain context (e.g., task instructions, previous cues) to
guide future behavior, would be similar to the role that goal
maintenance plays in the executive-attention theory by Engle
and Kane (2004). One could argue that the high- and low-
WMC participants in our study would differ in their ability
to represent and maintain the different instructions (attend
vs. ignore) within working memory. The lack of NP in the
low-WMC group could be attributed to a greater difficulty in
these individuals to effectively represent and/or continuously
update the attention instructions in working memory until
the prime appeared. While we cannot rule out that individual
differences in WMC might reflect a differential use of proactive
vs. reactive control strategies, several observations are pertinent
here. First, as above noted, the finding that the low-WMC group
showed reliably better recognition for the attended than for the
ignored primes indicates that they were able to maintain the
attend/ignore instructions in working memory. Second, even
assuming that high-WMC individuals make a more efficient
use of proactive strategies, it remains unclear why this should
result in negative, instead of reduced positive, priming from the
ignored (irrelevant) primes in our task. Unlike the inhibitory
accounts of NP (e.g., Houghton and Tipper, 1994; Tipper, 2001;
see also Hasher et al., 2007), the context-processing view is
noncommittal on whether a to-be-ignored single-prime word
should produce either NP, or reduced PP, relative to a to-be-
attended prime.
It is now widely agreed that working memory should be
viewed as a multifaceted construct, as multiple mechanisms
seem to be needed to explain individual differences in WMC
(e.g., Shipstead et al., 2012, 2015; Unsworth et al., 2015). It
has been recently suggested that variation in WMC and the
relation between WMC and higher-order cognitive functions,
reflects not only variation in domain-general attention control
abilities, or variation in the ability to strategically retrieve
information from secondary memory, but also variation in
the size (or scope of attention) or capacity of primary
memory.
By using WM tasks, such as change-detection/location (or
visual arrays), which provide a relatively pure measure of storage
capacity in a short-term buffer, a variety of recent studies have
reported evidence that both behavioral (i.e., the k-index; see
Cowan et al., 2005) and electrophysiological (i.e., Contralateral
Delay Activity-CDA- amplitude; Vogel and Machizawa, 2004)
estimates of a person’s storage capacity, do reliably correlate with
complex span performance and also with measures of broad
cognitive functions (e.g., fluid intelligence, or gF; see for example
Cowan et al., 2005; Fukuda et al., 2010; Shipstead et al., 2014,
2015; Unsworth et al., 2015). Despite such evidence, it is unclear
why individuals with larger storage capacities should also be more
likely to show NP than individuals with smaller storage abilities.
Some recent work suggests that visual arrays performance, just
as complex span measures, is not strictly driven by a limited-
capacity storage system, but it may also rely on controlled
attention abilities (Cowan et al., 2006; Fukuda and Vogel,
2011; Shipstead et al., 2015; Unsworth et al., 2015). Whereas
the relationship between attention control and storage capacity
remains a lively debated issue (see for example the different
conclusions reached by Shipstead et al., 2012, vs. Shipstead et al.,
2014, 2015), for future research addressing the dependence of
semantic NP on working memory resources, we recommend
the use of visual array tasks as estimates of WMC. This would
allow more directly investigate whether individual differences in
primary memory storage capacity could result critical to obtain
semantic NP.
CONCLUSION
As predicted, we found that individual differences in WMC
mainly affected the processing of the ignored (irrelevant) primes,
but not the processing of the attended (relevant) primes: Whereas
positive semantic priming was found in both participant groups,
reliable semantic NP was shown only by the high WMC group.
In stark contrast, the low WMC participants showed a PP effect
from ignored primes. Indeed, this facilitatory effect was only
slightly reduced compared to that generated by the attended
primes, and the difference (14 ms.) was not significant. However,
on the prime recognition task the low WMC group did show
a reliable difference between attended and ignored primes, and
overall, only the former condition showed a correlation with
WMC. This supports the view that encoding of attended items
into memory for a later recognition test is an active process
which depends on WMC. At least for the low WMC group,
ignoring an item for memory encoding appears to be more of a
passive process, a decision not to engage the (effortful) encoding
mechanism on a stimulus that is otherwise fully processed
(leading to semantic facilitation). On the basis of the semantic
NP results, the high WMC group appears to have the capacity
to engage a more active, inhibitory, processing of to-be-ignored
primes, suppressing the spread of activation through the semantic
network.
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